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ABSTRACT: Differences between the academic and military
communities and the dysfunction that occurs when these
communities comingle can have disastrous consequences for
foreign policy. Donald Bletz, writing on the subject in 1971, details
this dynamic as it related to the Vietnam War. His observations
can be applied to wars since and suggest the need for a balanced
relationship characterized by independence and mutual respect.

W

riting in the aftermath of the Kent State massacre, Colonel
Donald F. Bletz raised the concern that a dysfunctional
relationship between academia and the military not only
sets the tone for the military’s relationship with American society but
also impacts its warfighting abilities. More to the point, academia and
the military typically function as two separate and often warring worlds.1
Fifty years later Bletz’s observation holds true as the dysfunctional
academia-military relationship that led to the debacle in Vietnam has
repeated itself in the so-called forever wars of the twenty-first century.
Bletz saw the disaster of Vietnam primarily as a function of distrust
between the academic and military communities resulting as much from
their similarities as from their differences. What the intervening 50 years
has shown, however, is that such disasters are more a function of how
these two communities manage this distrust.
Bletz understood the importance of the academia-military
relationship to national security. This relationship, with its associated
functions and dysfunctions, arises where the interests and activities
of academia and the military converge: first, when the military brings
graduates from academia to serve as military professionals, and second,
when academics make their way into senior-level national security
positions. Dysfunctions at those points of convergence, according to
Bletz, give rise to disasters such as the war in Vietnam.
Bletz was also correct in asserting such foreign policy disasters
arise as a function of how each community relates to society as well
as to one another. Both communities see themselves as guardians
while simultaneously regarding the other as a threat to what they seek
to protect. Thus as guardians both feel isolated not only from each
other but from the society they claim to serve. As a result, the military
experiences less access to universities as a commissioning source, and
1. Colonel Donald F. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions: The Academic and the Soldier in
Contemporary America,” Parameters 1, no. 2 (1971): 2.
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both communities engage in poor communication with each other and
society over policy matters.
Over the last 50 years, however, the military has translated that
isolation into increased social trust, while academia apparently has not.
That asymmetry in public trust coupled with improved cooperation
between the two communities—often in response to the dysfunctions
experienced during the Vietnam era—has generated dysfunctions of its
own without fully resolving the ones of the past.

Relationships with Society

Bletz argued while the military and academia each see themselves
as the guardian of American democracy, they perceive that role in
fundamentally different ways. Academics, he argued, see themselves as
“critic[s] of contemporary society . . . while the [military] sees [itself] as
the defender.”2 Those different roles attract different kinds of people,
amplifying a sense of estrangement. Academia attracts more liberally
minded individuals while the military attracts more conservative
thinkers.3 Academics thus view themselves as government outsiders
who, due to their broad educational role, are closer to the larger society,
and military professionals see themselves as government insiders who,
due to the cultural as well as physical separation necessary for effective
defense, are distanced from society.4
Bletz certainly played a little fast and loose with these generalities,
something he repeatedly acknowledged. But the hyperbole he employed
captures something important not just about the academic and military
communities themselves, but also about the importance of their
relationship. In claiming the role of social guardian, neither the academic
nor the soldier holds society in high regard, which results in a sense of
social isolation for both communities. For the academic, the isolation
results from living “in a world they never made and for which they [take]
no responsibility.”5 And while the military is eager for responsibility, it
also does not accept responsibility for the character of American society.
In fact, Bletz attributed the military’s disposition not to vote as an effort
to avoid the political taint partisanship would entail.
A sense of isolation from the larger society is further amplified by
these communities’ hierarchical nature and near total institutionalization
of members’ daily lives. Both communities, Bletz observed, employ
hierarchies that determine who is brought in, what achievements they
are recognized for, and whether and to what position or rank they
are promoted. Of course those hierarchies are more decentralized in
academia than in the military; for Bletz, this translated into more local
autonomy for academics on individual campuses.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4–6.
Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
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Bletz argued it was “the rank structure in both professions which
makes the systems work.”6 While there are certainly similarities, a
closer look suggests these similarities are superficial. Both communities
certainly have formal structures. In the military there are levels
of command within which roles are further differentiated between
command and staff functions. In this structure autonomy, at least as
it is related to the function of the institution, is proportionate to level:
the higher the level of command, the more autonomy one has. The
problem for the military is that this arrangement can often privilege
the desire for stability and control over the demands of the profession,
which values flexibility, discretion, and innovation among other things.7
In academia, however, power and authority are not simply
decentralized, it is diffused. While a hierarchy of presidents, provosts,
and deans oversees the academic enterprise, actual governance is
shared by a number of actors including a board of trustees, a president,
faculty, and to a lesser degree, students. This system is intended to
foster cooperation between these actors by creating a more democratic
decision-making process. But because it diffuses autonomy throughout
the system, the system can be slow and resistant to change and often pits
the faculty, usually in the body of a faculty senate, against the university
leadership. The effect is often gridlock.8 So, while by title, position, and
rank university presidents, provosts, and deans might seem analogous
to military commanders, their functionalities are very different.
In another important difference, academia is comprised of
competing hierarchies in a way the military is not. In addition to the
campus hierarchy, academics are also governed by the fields they work
in, which can provide certification or even curriculum guidance. In the
military this arrangement would be analogous to functional branches
having input into whether a platoon leader, for example, executed a
particular operation correctly. But because of the relationship between
academic reputation and opportunities for promotion, academics can
depend as much if not more on their field of study for that reputation
than the university that would promote them.
Concurrent with this hierarchical structure, both institutions
provide for a variety of personal needs to the point that venturing into
the larger society can feel, if not actually be, optional. Where the military
has “commissaries, post exchanges, [and] service clubs,” academia
has “cooperative shopping facilities, bookstores, student unions, and
faculty clubs.”9 Bletz recognized but did not explore this fact; however,
it is not hard to see the immersive experience of both communities

6. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 5.
7. James G. Pierce, The Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army: Is the Organizational Culture of the
Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (Carlisle Barracks, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), iv, 106–7.
8. Derek Bok, Higher Education in America, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2013), 44–71.
9. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 5.
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makes interaction with and understanding of the larger society, or vice
versa, necessary.
Bletz argued this near total institutionalization, coupled with
society’s ambivalence regarding the utility of each community, isolates
the military and academia from American society. He did acknowledge
this isolation was largely self-imposed and illustrated this dynamic
in an admittedly cartoonish fashion: where academics are “quiet and
intelligent, but apparently unmanly” the soldier is “manly, but not
too intelligent.”10 Where the former emphasizes thinking, the latter
emphasizes doing. They are joined together by a mutual alcohol problem
and are saved from obscurity and irrelevance by “[the] rugged [civilian]
individual, clad in buckskin who somehow compensates for [their]
shortcomings.”11
Interestingly, Bletz wrote when those views were beginning to
change, at least for the military. American society has always had an
aversion to a standing, professional military largely due to the original
colonists’ experience with the military’s role in domestic oppression in
the countries from which they came.12 As a result, the military had to
fight to earn its status as a profession. The Vietnam experience further
soured the military’s relationship with the American people who were no
longer interested in allowing their children to be drafted to fight wars of
dubious necessity. As a result, the military in the 1970s transitioned to an
all-volunteer force. While that change has further exacerbated the sense
of social isolation—less than one-half of 1 percent of the population
now serve—popular confidence in the military as an institution is above
70 percent, reaching a high of 74 percent in 2018, up from a low of 50
percent in 1981.13
In the 50 years since Bletz wrote his article, campus life has changed
dramatically. The massacre at Kent State University marked a shift away
from the politically active campuses of the 1960s and early 1970s.14 Since
then college campuses have become more diverse, more expensive, and
more focused on preprofessional studies and skills development rather
than education for education’s sake.15 Due to the shift in the 1980s from
grant-heavy to loan-heavy financial aid awards, the amount of student
debt has increased to the point where the cost-benefit analysis of a
10. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
11. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 4.
12. Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., The US Military Profession into the Twenty-First
Century: War, Peace and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 60.
13. “Demographics of the U.S. Military,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, 2020,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/demographics-us-military; and Gallup, “Military and National
Defense,” https://news.gallup.com/poll/1666/military-national-defense.aspx.
14. Jerry Lembcke, “The Times, They Changed,” Chronicle of Higher Education, April 25, 2010,
https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-times-they-changed.
15. Imed Bouchrika, “11 Top Trends in Higher Education: 2020/2021 Data, Insights &
Predictions,” Guide2Research, August 24, 2020, https://www.guide2research.com/research
/trends-in-higher-education; and Maura Hohman, “Why is College So Expensive? 4 Reasons for
the Ever-rising Costs,” Today, October 16, 2020, https://www.today.com/tmrw/why-college-so
-expensive-4-reasons-ever-rising-costs-t194972.
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traditional college education raises questions about its overall utility.16
In contrast to the military, public confidence in higher education in 2018
was 48 percent, despite—or because of—36 percent of the population
over 25 attaining bachelor’s degrees.17 Today higher education is in the
midst of a reexamination of its purpose and relevance within the larger
society.18 In many ways, the public perception of both professions has
flipped in the last half century.

Relationship to Each Other

The separation of the academic and military communities would
be sustainable if it were not for two points of convergence. The first
point is the accessions process for military officers. In 1970 the Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) was the largest source of commissions
for the Army, producing around 12,400 graduates a year.19 From 1968
to 1974, however, ROTC closed 88 detachments, many of which were in
elite universities in the northeast. The reasons for those closures were
complex. The common narrative is that popular opposition to the war
in Vietnam, exacerbated by the shootings at Kent State, encouraged
schools to end their ROTC programs.20
While it is true some ROTC units closed temporarily due to
vandalism—Kent State before the massacre—the reason generally
given by the schools to the Department of Defense was that ROTC
courses did not meet the school’s academic standards and thus were not
eligible for credit. The Department decided to close and relocate those
detachments rather than revise the courses, and it also established 80
new detachments, mostly in schools in the south and west.21
These conditions shaped the quantity, quality, and diversity of the
officer corps and determined the potential for interactions between
future military officers and the future cultural and policy elites in the
United States. Two recent studies have shown that while the percentage
of people who graduate from elite schools and attain the most influential
policy positions may have decreased since mid-century when sociologists
16. Lynn Pasquerella, “The Purpose of Higher Education and Its Future,” Liberal Education 105,
no. 3–4 (Summer/Fall 2019), https://www.aacu.org/liberaleducation/2019/summer-fall/president.
17. Scott Jaschik, “Falling Confidence in Higher Ed: Gallup Finds Unusually Large Drop—
Primarily but Not Exclusively among Republicans—between 2015 and 2018,” Inside Higher Ed,
October 9, 2018, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/09/gallup-survey-finds-falling
-confidence-higher-education; and “U.S. Census Bureau Releases New Educational Attainment
Data,” United States Census Bureau, March 30, 2020, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press
-releases/2020/educational-attainment.html.
18. Pasquerella, “Higher Education.”
19. “Army Is Shortening Active Duty for Half of R. O. T. C. Graduates,” New York Times,
August 8, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/08/archives/army-is-shortening-active-duty
-for-half-of-rotc-graduates.html.
20. Larry Gordon, “Top U.S. Schools Welcoming ROTC Back to Campus,” Chicago Tribune,
July 6, 2011, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2011-07-06-ct-met-rotc-national
-20110706-story.html.
21. Diane H. Mazur, “The R.O.T.C. Myth,” New York Times, October 24, 2010,
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/opinion/25Mazur.html; and Jean Marbella, “ROTC
Resurgent on College Campuses Where Once Scorned,” Baltimore Sun, November 18, 2001,
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2001-11-18-0111180052-story.html.
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developed the theories of elite formation, elite schools count among their
alumni a disproportionate number of business, policy, and cultural elites
relative to the total number of graduates.22 With close to 87 percent of all
college graduates having no military experience, it stands to reason weak
connections and mistrust exist between academics and the military.23
Bletz argued the second point of convergence occurred when
academics crossed over into government. As Bletz noted, academics,
particularly scientists, enthusiastically participated in weapons
development in support of then President Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal and the Second World War—a war with broad public support.
In particular, the academic community—contrary to its purpose—kept
criticism to a minimum, especially over matters that would later become
controversial in the 1960s such as unconditional surrender and the
employment of the atomic bomb.24
Despite general opposition to the Vietnam War, some members
of the academic community—or at least persons with academic
backgrounds—moved into government and participated in making war
policy. Bletz specifically mentioned Henry Kissinger, a Harvard faculty
member who was critical of the military’s attrition strategy employed
at the beginning of the war. Bletz could also have mentioned Robert
McNamara, secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968. In what is sometimes
referred to as the “McNamara Revolution,” he brought in a number of
so-called whiz kids from academia and research centers who tried to
impose a single common method for management, acquisitions, and
budgeting for all the services, many elements of which exist to this day.25
While McNamara did solicit the advice of senior military leaders
in implementing his reforms, they offered little constructive input and
were eventually marginalized from much of the budget decision-making
process.26 In fact, the relationship between the Joint Staff and senior
civilian leadership—including President Lyndon Johnson—was frayed
because the options the Joint Staff gave for prosecuting the war were
not viable.27
Related to this point of convergence, academia at the time was
showing a growing interest in military affairs. This interest took two
forms. One form was the development of the field of strategic studies,
best represented by Thomas C. Schelling, that drew on the fields of
22. Steven Brint and Sarah R. K. Yoshikawa, “The Educational Backgrounds of American
Business and Government Leaders: Inter-Industry Variation in Recruitment from Elite Colleges and
Graduate Programs,” Social Forces 96, no. 2 (2017): 561–90, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/sf/sox059;
and Steven Brint et al., “Where Ivy Matters: The Educational Backgrounds of U.S. Cultural Elites,”
Sociology of Education 93, no. 2 (2020): 153–72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038040719898505.
23. Lynn Milan, “Characteristics of College Graduates, with a Focus on Veterans,” InfoBrief,
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, NSF 19-300, National Science Foundation,
October 22, 2018, 7, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2019/nsf19300/nsf19300.pdf.
24. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 8.
25. Charles A. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 153.
26. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians, 154.
27. Steven L. Rearden, Council of War: A History of the Joints Chiefs of Staff 1942–1991
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012), 286.
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economics, political science, and international relations to inform
policies on the employment and use of the military. The other form,
pioneered by scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz,
developed into the field of military sociology, which sought to inform
military organizational policies.28
Both fields have grown considerably, bringing academia and the
military closer together in ways Bletz did not anticipate. These programs
have provided a path for military officers to obtain advanced degrees
in these fields, ensuring such expertise resides within the military. For
example, the Army now sends over 400 officers to advanced civilian
schooling every year.29 And these officers do not just teach at service
academies or at professional military education institutions as Bletz did.
Many others, particularly foreign area officers and strategic planners, go
directly to operational assignments after graduation. The effect, of course,
is the military is better able to participate in, and thus control, many of
the external reforms civilian academics recommend. A good example of
this integration is the development of counterinsurgency strategy during
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, promulgated by military officers
with advanced degrees and members of civilian academia.30
The military is further favored in this dynamic because it is much
easier for an officer to move from the military into academia than it is
for an academic to move into the military. One difference Bletz did not
note was that the military discharges its members much earlier in life
than academia. Many senior officers reach mandatory retirement age
while still in their late forties and early fifties, and some elect to take
their military experience and advanced degrees and seek positions in
academia. According to data collected by George Mason University’s
Schar School of Policy and Government Mapping Shadow Influence
project, since the early 1990s over 200 academic-related positions have
been filled by retired O8-level (major general) officers and above.31
Some very senior retired military officers have gone on to lead
universities, such as Admiral William H. McRaven, the former chancellor
of the University of Texas System, Air Force General Richard B. Myers
who is currently the president of Kansas State University, and Army
Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen who is now the president of the
University of South Carolina. Of course, as was the case with Caslen,
not all were initially welcomed.32 Nonetheless, the fact they are able to
acquire such senior positions suggests the rift between academia and the
28. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 8.
29. United States Army, “Advanced Civil Schooling,” MyArmyBenefits, August 31, 2020,
https://myarmybenefits.us.army.mil/Benefit-Library/Federal-Benefits/Advanced-Civil-Schooling
-(ACS)?serv=122.
30. Sarah Sewall, “Introduction,” in The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field
Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006), xxi–xliii.
31. Janine R.Wedel and Julia L. E. Pfaff, “Mapping Shadow Influence project,” George
Mason Schar School of Public Policy and Government, 2020.
32. Lucas Daprile, “Despite Opposition, Gamecocks Pick Retired General as School’s Next
President,” Military.com, July 20, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/07/20/despite
-opposition-gamecocks-pick-retired-general-schools-next-president.html.
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military, while real, may not be as big as Bletz originally suggested. Bletz
himself became president of Wilson College in nearby Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, where he became an honorary alumnus for his leadership.33
While it is easier for the military to transition to academia, a growing
number of research partnerships between the Department of Defense
and academic institutions focus not just on hard sciences and technology
but on the humanities as well. The DoD Minerva Research Initiative
grants program supporting social science research has provided $20 to
$22 million in funding, much of which was allocated to social science
research and was both widely accepted and criticized within the social
science community.34 A number of university-based research centers
also receive DoD and private donor funding.35

Policy Implications

What Bletz did get right is that rift, no matter how big, can produce
disastrous results for national security. What should have been a
“brilliant” cooperative enterprise ended up, in the case of Vietnam, in
disaster with academics fleeing policy making to write books to “explain
away” their involvement.36 In the case of Vietnam, Bletz argued from
the military perspective, asserting academics not only created the
policies that led to the war, but their military reforms, especially under
McNamara, alienated senior military leadership from the decision
making. From the academic-turned-policymaker perspective, the fault
lay with an incompetent military that could not figure out how to defeat
a much less technologically advanced enemy, thereby ensuring those
policies would fail.
This dynamic repeated itself in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the
1990s, much of the academic community protested the presence of
ROTC on campuses as well as other engagements with the military
because of opposition to the military’s policies prohibiting lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals from joining.37
While perhaps not as impactful as the closings in the 1960s, a number
of top-tier schools, including Stanford, Brown, and Harvard, excluded
ROTC from their campuses until the ban on LGBTQ participation was
lifted in 2011.38 Now that the military has dropped most of its barriers
33. Wilson College, “Alumnae Association of Wilson College Awards,” June 7, 2020,
https://www.wilson.edu/aawc-awards.
34. Elizabeth Redden, “Pentagon Proposes Cuts to Social Science Research,” Inside Higher
Ed, March 5, 2020, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/05/pentagons-social-science
-research-program-chopping-block.
35. The Military Family Research Institute at Purdue University (website), https://www.mfri
.purdue.edu/.
36. Bletz, “Mutual Misperceptions,” 9.
37. Devin Dwyer, “Repeal of Gay Ban Opens Door to ROTC Return at Top Schools,” ABC
News, December 21, 2010, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dont-repeal-rotc-return-university
-campuses/story?id=12453612; and James Fallows, “DADT and Ivy League ROTC,” Atlantic, May 24,
2010, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/dadt-and-ivy-league-rotc/57203/.
38. Karen McVeigh and Paul Harris, “US Military Lifts Ban on Openly Gay Troops,” Guardian,
September 20, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/20/us-military-lifts-ban-gay
-troops; and Gordon, “Top U.S. Schools.”

Retrospectives 1971: (Un)civil-Military Relations

Pfaff and Pfaff

117

to service by members of the LGBTQ community, it has enjoyed more
access and less opposition on college campuses.
Like Vietnam, the involvement of the academic community in
national security policy in the decision to go to war in Iraq and in
elements of the execution of the war itself produced grim results. One
reason cited for the US decision to invade Iraq was the writings of
political philosopher Leo Strauss suggesting regime change was the only
proper way to deal with a “great anti-modern tyrant” such as Saddam
Hussein.39 Academic influences did not stop there. The military, in
an effort to demonstrate it had learned some lessons from Vietnam,
invited academia to participate in operations. Not only were individual
scholars employed for their political science and democracy-building
expertise, the military tried to purchase academic experience wholesale
by establishing Human Terrain System teams, comprised of experienced
anthropologists and others from relevant fields, to advise commanders
on how to navigate cultural pitfalls in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan.40
Perhaps not surprisingly those efforts did not go well. Bletz
complained academics in government in the Vietnam era ran back to
academia to write books absolving them of responsibility. Much the
same happened in Iraq. Whether one wants to impute, malign, or simply
display selfish intent as Bletz did, the fact is a number of high-profile
academics who assisted the military in Iraq did just that. An obvious
case in point is Stanford scholar Larry Diamond and his book Squandered
Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy
to Iraq.41
The damage inflicted by the effort to include academia in the
execution of the war went even deeper. The American Anthropological
Association declared participation in the Human Terrain System
program unethical and discouraged its members from participating.42
While some anthropologists did participate, many positions had to
be filled with inadequately qualified persons. As a result, many teams
without the relevant expertise went to the field, which resulted in
predictable and disastrous results.43
These disasters, however, were less a result of the differences
between the military and academic communities, than they were a
function of academia and the military growing closer together. The
39. Scott Horton, “Leo Strauss and the Iraq War,” Harper’s Magazine, June 3, 2009,
https://harpers.org/2009/06/leo-strauss-and-the-iraq-war/.
40. Scott Jaschik, “Embedded Conflicts,” Inside Higher Ed, July 7, 2015, https://www
.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/army-shuts-down-controversial-human-terrain-systemcriticized-many-anthropologists.
41. Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring
Democracy to Iraq (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).
42. Jaschik, “Embedded Conflicts”; and “AAA Opposes U.S. Military’s Human Terrain System
Project,” American Anthropological Association, https://www.americananthro.org/ConnectWithAAA
/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1626, accessed January 14, 2021.
43. Christopher J. Lamb et al., Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural
Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics, 2013), 50–55; and
Brian R. Price, “Human Terrain at the Crossroads,” Joint Force Quarterly 87 (4th Quarter/October
2017), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/1325979/human-terrain-at-the-crossroads/.
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difficulty with such proximity was and continues to be the outsized
influence of the military over the academic national security agenda.
Not only does the military pay for research, it pays tuition that helps
fill classrooms and then cycles its graduates, many of whom are as well
credentialed as their academic counterparts, often either back into
academia or to military institutions that interact with academia.

Conclusion

The result is a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dynamic
suggesting a harmonic relationship between academia and the military is
not only impossible, it may also be undesired. When the military controls
too much of the agenda, it risks losing an important critical voice—only
valuable as such when lightly connected. Ties are important; the right
ties are critical.
Unfortunately, Bletz’s—as well as this review’s—anecdotal
approach to the issues raised do not provide much of a basis to form
recommendations. Bletz, however, shed a light, albeit a dim one, on a
civil-military dynamic that given the disastrous outcomes to date, appears
to be poorly understood, at least by the members the communities
themselves. Accordingly, this analysis recommends more attention and
study be focused on the academia-military dynamic in the interest of
seeking balance rather than expanding or improving cooperation and
convergence between the two.
It may be the case that academia and the military can serve society
separately. But the natural synergies as well as the desire to do good will
ensure separation will never be complete. In fact, perhaps Bletz’s most
important insight regarded the dependency each community has on the
other for its status. Due to the points of convergence, the result of the
Vietnam War diminished the prestige of both institutions not only “in
the eyes of each other” but “in the eyes of the nation as a whole.”44 This
point only further underscores the importance of both communities to
national security.
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